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Abstract: This paper addresses the apparent paradox of simultaneous neoliberal 
change and welfare-statist, corporatist continuity by presenting an empirical case 
study of the advent of neoliberal ideas in Finland in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
paper focuses on the attempts of a free-market think tank EVA and the 
employers’ association STK to advance policies such as economic deregulation, 
international competitiveness, welfare retrenchment, and active social and labour 
market policies through the neoliberal retasking of the corporatist Finnish welfare 
state. EVA and the STK utilised seemingly non-neoliberal means, i.e. an 
economic policy consensus and tripartite corporatist arrangements, and 
reformulated their content to better correspond with business interests. Instead of 
demolition, the outcome has been the redefinition and incremental transformation 
of the state from a provider of welfare to a promoter of competitiveness, 
productivity, and employment. 
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Introduction 
Business history needs to address ‘big questions’ that have general, even universal, 
significance. This is a view expressed by leading business historians in reaction to their 
sense of neglect of their field. Despite increasing interest in the economy and economic 
actors in other branches of history and in social sciences, business history is seldom 
cited. To improve the situation, business historians need to engage in a closer dialogue 
 
 
with the broader discipline of history by widening the scope of their study from firms as 
economic actors to the political, social, and cultural role of business locally, nationally, 
and globally. (Friedman and Jones, 2013; Jones, van Leeuwen, & Broadberry, 2012, pp. 
228–230; Scranton and Fridenson, 2013, pp. 5, 9.) This paper responds to the call by 
studying one of the biggest questions of our time: the rise of neoliberalism. 
According to social scientists, neoliberal ideas and policies are characterised by 
their ability to adopt different forms and to adapt to varying local conditions. This, of 
course, makes the phenomenon difficult to define. A working definition can, however, 
be provided: neoliberalism is an intellectual and political project that considers free 
markets to be a superior mode of social organisation and market solutions to be ideal 
answers to social problems. Contrary to a common misconception, neoliberalism is not 
about rolling back the state but about retasking the state. Accordingly, and in contrast to 
classical liberalism, neoliberalism considers a strong state necessary; its task is to secure 
the free workings of market forces. (Ban, 2016, p. 3; Mirowski, 2013, pp. 40–41, 56; 
Mudge, 2008, pp. 705–707; Peck, 2010, pp. xv, 30; Schrecker and Bambra, 2015, p. 
13.)  
As a concrete set of policies, neoliberalism has included, e.g. economic 
deregulation, privatisation of state enterprise, and retrenchment of welfare services. In 
the realm of industrial relations, neoliberal measures have included increasing flexibility 
in the labour market and the decentralisation of wage bargaining. Flexibility has been 
pursued through active labour market policies, such as promoting employability and 
skills development instead of income maintenance in case of unemployment. (Martin, 
2004, p. 44; Schrecker and Bambra, 2015, pp. 13, 15–17.)  
In general overview, it seems evident that a neoliberal turn has come to 
characterise the Western world from the 1970s and 1980s onwards. Under intense 
 
 
political and economic pressure in the 1960s and 1970s – the oil crisis, galloping 
inflation, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, rising unemployment, student riots, 
and leftist radicalism – faith in the social democratic post-war policies of state 
interventionism, regulated capitalism, and redistributive welfare systems crumbled. This 
faith was replaced by a belief in unrestricted markets, economic deregulation, and 
decentralised industrial relations. The usefulness of an economically active state and 
extensive welfare services was questioned, and privatisation and welfare cuts were 
adopted as ideals. (Berend, 2012.) 
The realisation of neoliberal ideas has, however, been an incoherent process 
filled with contradictions. As noted by Mudge (2008, p. 723), the most effective 
advocates of neoliberal policies in Western Europe have often been either sympathetic 
to or representatives of the left and centre-left. The European welfare model has only 
been altered, not destroyed (Berend, 2012, p. 414). In North European countries, 
neoliberal monetary and fiscal policies have been adopted while simultaneously 
preserving strong welfare-state ideologies, progressive tax regimes, and corporatist 
industrial relations (Ban, 2016, pp. 8, 14–15). Despite an alleged common trajectory 
toward deregulated and decentralised labour markets, divergent industrial relations 
regimes remain and corporatist institutions persist in several countries (Baccaro & 
Howell, 2011; Hermann, 2014; Traxler, 2010, pp. 151–152; Wood, 2001, pp. 369, 407). 
This paper addresses the paradox of simultaneous neoliberal change and 
welfare-statist, corporatist continuity by presenting an empirical case study of the 
advent of neoliberal ideas in Finland in the 1970s and 1980s. As an example of the 
Nordic model (see Greve, 2007; Ryner, 2007 for more detail), it has combined free 
market capitalism with comprehensive welfare services and tripartite corporatism; 
 
 
Finland thus provides a particularly interesting setting in which to examine the advance 
of neoliberalism.  
The paper focuses on the role of the business community in introducing 
neoliberalism in Finland. Three specific questions are addressed: 
 How and to what extent does a corporatist welfare state adopt neoliberal ideas 
and policies?  
 What kind of neoliberal policies did Finnish business promote? 
 What kind of means did they utilise to push these policies, and how successful 
were their attempts? 
The Finnish business community is studied through the lens of two business interest 
associations: a business-funded, free-market think tank called Elinkeinoelämän 
Valtuuskunta (EVA, the Council of Economic Organisations in Finland) and the central 
employers’ association Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto (STK; the Confederation of 
Finnish Employers). 
 The body of archival data consists of the proceedings, memoranda, and the 
manuscript collections of EVA. Regarding the STK, the proceedings of the highest 
decision-making bodies, the board and the executive committee, are utilised. These are 
complemented by the proceedings of Suomen Teollisuuden Keskusvaliokunta (STKV; 
the Central Committee of Finnish Industry), which was a joint organ and a discussion 
arena for the employers’ association and Finnish industry’s trade associations. The 
approach of this article is qualitative. In analysing the primary sources, the methodology 
used has been the core historical method as described by Kipping, Wadhwani, and 
Bucheli (2014), which combines source criticism, triangulation, and hermeneutics.  
EVA and the STK have had very distinct roles among Finnish business interest 
associations. Think tanks, such as EVA, are research and advocacy organisations that 
 
 
produce information, take part in public discussion, and provide policy 
recommendations about issues that they consider important (McGann, 2007, pp. 5–6, 
11; Rich, 2004, p. 11). Employers’ associations, such as the STK, traditionally 
concentrate on industrial relations issues, wage bargaining, and labour and social 
policies (Lanzalaco, 2008, p. 295). Earlier literature has noted the significant role of 
think tanks in advancing neoliberal ideas in various countries (Blyth, 2002, p. 156; 
Denham and Garnett, 1998, pp. v, vii, 16; McGann, 2007, p. 49; Pühringer and Stelzer-
Orthofer, 2016). The relationship of employers’ associations with neoliberal ideas has 
been studied less but some literature exists (e.g. Amable, 2016; Kinderman, 2017), in 
particular concerning active labour market policies (e.g. Martin, 2004; Martin, 2005). 
Some social scientists suggest that support from business explains the resilience 
of corporatist industrial relations and social democratic welfare regimes (Martin, 2004; 
Thelen & van Wijnbergen 2003; Traxler, 2010; Wood, 2001, p. 408). In contrast, others 
claim that even in countries with strong corporatist and/or welfare state institutions, 
business pursues an aggressive neoliberal agenda and aims to bring down any 
constraints on market activity (Kinderman, 2017). However, scholars agree on the need 
for more empirical research on the preferences, motivations, and actions of business 
regarding welfare and labour market policies and their transformation toward a 
neoliberal direction (Kinderman, 2017, pp. 590, 609; Martin, 2005, p. 128). 
Kinderman (2017, p. 591), while strongly arguing for employer’s aggressive 
neoliberalism, admits that ‘their strategy is more complex than blanket opposition and 
an all-out assault on non-liberal institutions’. Taking this observation as a starting point, 
this paper argues that business can, in fact, push neoliberal ideas by exploiting 
seemingly non-neoliberal policy-making practices and institutions. In the Finnish case, 
this argument translates into an ostensibly paradoxical advancement of a neoliberal 
 
 
agenda through utilisation, not demolition, of consensus policy and corporatist 
industrial relations.    
The paper is divided in six sections. The next section introduces the context and 
the main actors EVA and the STK. The following two sections examine the attempts of 
EVA and the STK to advance the goals of competitiveness, economic deregulation, 
welfare state reform, and active social and labour market policies through consensual 
and corporatist decision-making. The penultimate section analyses the reception and 
impact of EVA and the STK’s initiatives, while the concluding section highlights the 
contributions that the Finnish case makes to both business history and wider social 
scientific discussions concerning the relationship between business and neoliberalism. 
Business under pressure 
The period from the late 1940s until the turn of the 1970s has been characterised as an 
era of post-war settlement in Western Europe. A central feature of the settlement was 
the state’s strong economic role, which had expanded notably during the Second World 
War and thereafter included tasks such as economic regulation, state-owned enterprises, 
redistributive taxation, and public welfare services. (Eley, 2012.) Other essential 
elements in the system were also tripartite cooperation and coordinated wage 
bargaining. Their main objective was to encourage economic growth and an increase in 
productivity through wage moderation. (Crafts & Toniolo, 2012.) 
Following pan-European trends, the Finnish economy became extensively 
regulated. State authorities controlled prices, wages, rents, the movement of capital, and 
interest rates (Outinen, 2017, p. 392); regulations on financial markets remained in 
place until the 1980s. The employers’ association STK and Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten 
Keskusliitto (from 1969 onward Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö, SAK; the 
 
 
Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions) played a central role in the 
implementation of wage and price regulations. In the post-war decades, Finland 
gradually became a corporatist society in which social and economic policies were 
established in tripartite negotiations and agreements between the state, trade unions, and 
employers (Bergholm, 2009; Kiander, Sauramo, & Tanninen, 2011).  
The development culminated in 1968 with the conclusion of the first 
comprehensive incomes policy agreement (tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu). In the 
incomes policy negotiations, labour market matters became tightly intertwined with 
economic and social policies. The agreements reached applied to virtually all wage-
earners and covered a wide range of issues, from wages and worker rights to taxation 
and social security benefits. (Kettunen, 2006; Kiander et al., 2011.) The first incomes 
policy agreement was primarily a counter-measure against a potential wage-price spiral 
after the significant devaluation of the Finnish Mark in 1967. Since all parties were 
satisfied with the results, they continued tripartite negotiations in the following years. 
By the early 1970s, incomes policy had become a central feature in the Finnish policy-
making system. 
The employers’ objectives for incomes policy were ambitious: the STK aimed at 
securing Finnish competitiveness, keeping inflation in check, maintaining industrial 
peace, and limiting wage growth to follow productivity increases (STKV, 1970; STK 
board, 1970a, 1971). These goals were important enough for the employers to accept 
the concessions they had to make, such as tax increases, a solidaristic wage policy, and 
the growth of the welfare state, the funding of which was supported by employers’ 
contributions (Kiander et al., 2011, pp. 520, 523).  
The political climate of the early 1970s forced the employers to compromise 
over their goals. Like their colleagues in other Western countries, Finnish business 
 
 
leaders found themselves in a predicament (e.g. Blyth, 2002; Useem, 1984; Waterhouse, 
2014). They felt that the intellectual climate of Finland was increasingly critical, even 
hostile, towards private enterprise and the whole market economy system. The political 
left seemed to both strengthen and radicalise, loudly calling for the nationalisation of 
private business. Extensive state intervention in the economy aggravated the distress of 
businesspeople, who felt that when in conflict, ‘political realities’ without exception 
overrode ‘economic facts’ as the determinants of decision-making. (Jakobson, 1976a; 
Wuokko, 2017, p. 285.) 
In the realm of industrial relations, the zeitgeist took the form of widespread 
(and in part politically motivated) strikes. The STK executives suspected that the trade 
union movement’s radical Communists were collaborating with their Soviet comrades. 
According to the employers’ worst fears, the ultimate goal of the strikes was a 
revolution supported by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (STK board, 1970b; 
see, also, STK executive committee, 1973). Under these pressures, the principal 
motivation for the Finnish employers to engage in incomes policy agreements was the 
maintenance of social order. Because of this underlying rationale, the STK became the 
buttress of incomes policy in the 1970s. Through incomes policy agreements, the STK 
bought social peace although industrial peace was not always achieved (see, 
Savtschenko, 2015, pp. 20, 29–30). 
Centralised wage bargaining was not the only means with which the business 
community defended social order against leftist radicalism. A parallel means – adopted 
both in Finland and elsewhere – was the political mobilisation of business in the form of 
intensified lobbying and the establishment of new, more efficient interest associations 
(Wuokko, 2017, 284–285). As part of this counteroffensive, a pro-market think tank 
called Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta (EVA) was established in 1974. Founding 
 
 
members included employers’ associations (the STK and Liiketyönantajain 
Keskusliitto) and the interest associations of Finnish industries (Suomen 
Metsäteollisuuden Keskusliitto, Suomen Teollisuusliitto, and Teollisuudenharjoittajain 
Liitto), banking (Suomen Pankkiyhdistys), and cooperatives (Pellervo-Seura). (EVA, 
1974.) The first CEO of EVA was Max Jakobson, a widely respected former diplomat 
with Western sympathies, who was well connected both in Finland and internationally.  
EVA’s task was to create a general atmosphere that was friendlier toward 
private enterprise and the market economy system. This was to be done by initiating and 
taking part in public discussion and fostering contacts with leading politicians. The 
strategy of EVA was two-pronged and aimed at influencing both the public opinion and 
the views of decision-makers. (EVA, 1975a.) 
EVA was part of a wave of neoliberal think tanks that emerged throughout the 
West in the 1970s and 1980s. EVA was linked to these through its free-market ethos, 
condemnation of economic regulation, and critique of the public sector. EVA does not 
seem to have been in touch with the most central organisations of the neoliberal 
movement, such as the Mont Pelerin Society or the Atlas Foundation. (Plehwe, 2009, 
pp. 4–5; Plehwe & Walpen, 2006, pp. 29, 42.) In its early days, EVA’s list of potential 
partners included organisations such as the Swedish Studieförbundet Näringsliv och 
Samhällen (SNS), the Norwegian Libertas, and the British Aims of Freedom and 
Enterprise (known previously as the Aims of Industry) and Political and Economic 
Planning (EVA, 1975c). Of these, earlier scholarship has linked at least the SNS, 
Libertas, and Aims with neoliberalism. These contacts place EVA in a reference group 
that did not, at any rate, oppose neoliberal ideas (Blyth, 2002, pp. 215–219; Olsen, 
2014, p. 149; Tribe, 2009, p. 89). Judged by reports from international conferences and 
 
 
other trips abroad, EVA was soon able to engage in exchange of ideas with foreign 
organisations with similar interests (Piepponen, 1975; Sipilä, 1975).  
EVA proudly waved the flag of free-market ideas and adopted the strategy of 
attack as the best defence. Accordingly, EVA praised the free market as a prerequisite 
of democracy, freedom of choice, and economic growth (e.g. Jakobson, 1976b; Tiivola, 
1978). However, as EVA saw it, the ‘autonomous sphere of influence of the market 
mechanism’ was becoming narrower and narrower (Jakobson, 1975). The state 
encroached on the market through a myriad of economic regulations, which threatened 
to cripple private enterprise completely (EVA, 1976a; Jakobson, 1976b; Tiivola, 1978).  
The remedy that EVA suggested was the adoption of a consensus policy, which 
the next section examines in more detail. What did EVA’s idea of consensus entail, and 
how was the initiative received? What was the relation between consensus and 
corporatism, and how did the STK react to consensus policy? 
Corporatism, consensus, competitiveness 
EVA commented on the corporatist decision-making system of Finland in a reserved 
tone, arguing that centralised bargaining limited individual choice and freedom. The 
growing political clout of interest groups tarnished the decision-making system. As a 
result, sound and simple decisions were being replaced by expensive compromises. 
(EVA, 1976a.) 
Interestingly, however, EVA did not want to throw the comprehensive 
negotiation system away. As CEO of EVA Max Jakobson put it, incomes policy was a 
step in the right direction but it was not far-reaching enough. Speaking during the 
recession induced by the oil crisis, Jakobson proposed the establishment of a wide 
national consensus on an economic and social policy strategy that should be followed in 
 
 
order to overcome the prevailing difficulties and to secure Finland’s international 
competitiveness. (Jakobson, 1976a.) 
EVA called for negotiations between representatives of the government, the 
Bank of Finland, local authorities, business, and labour market parties. The purpose of 
the negotiations would be creating a national consensus on the suitable measures and 
goals of Finnish economic policy. The negotiation partners would also decide on the 
allocation of the national economy’s ‘meagre resources’ in a way that would best 
guarantee prosperity for the Finns. This main goal was to be realised through sub-
targets, such as balanced economic growth, stable price levels, restoration of 
international competitiveness, high employment, and social progress. (EVA, 1976c, 
1977a.)  
EVA’s initiative was primarily directed to the leadership of Suomen 
Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP, the Social Democratic Party of Finland). The SDP 
was a true powerhouse in Finnish politics: from the mid-1960s until the early 1990s, the 
SDP was almost always among the government parties. The party could not be waved 
aside by anyone willing to influence Finnish politics – including EVA, which was 
therefore keen to establish contacts with the Social Democrats (EVA, 1975b, 1976b).  
Controversy remains regarding if and to what extent EVA contributed to a 
change of heart among the SDP leadership (e.g. Koroma, 2015, pp. 84–85; Lipponen, 
2009, pp. 384, 475). Whatever the stimulus, the SDP executive members reformulated 
their thinking on economic policy and accepted business-friendly, pro-market ideas 
during the mid-1970s recession. In order to keep employment at a high level and to 
secure the tax base necessary for the maintenance of welfare services, the SDP adopted 
the international competitiveness of the Finnish industry as a fundamental economic–
political goal. (Outinen, 2017; Savtschenko, 2015, pp. 114, 193.) 
 
 
Consequently, it was relatively easy for the representatives of EVA and the SDP 
party executive to see eye to eye in a series of low-profile negotiations in 1976 and 
1977 (EVA, 1977b, 1977c). These negotiations paved the way for the adoption of a 
consensus policy after the formation of an SDP-led Kalevi Sorsa cabinet in May 1977. 
The cabinet’s economic recovery program aimed to resuscitate the economy by 
supporting private industry, promoting competitiveness, restricting the growth of the 
public sector, and limiting increases in taxation (Outinen, 2017).  
The Sorsa cabinet is generally regarded as the initiator of a consensus policy in 
Finland. Consensus has been characterised as a trade-off between the political left with 
the political right and business circles. The former acknowledged the importance of 
international competitiveness of Finnish business for the common good while the latter 
gave approval to extensive welfare services (Saari, 2010, pp. 482–483). At the heart of 
consensus thus lay an understanding that national interest demanded an adjustment to 
‘economic necessities’. To cope with tightening international competition, the cost-
competitiveness of the Finnish export industry was adopted as the overriding objective 
of economic and social policy. (Kettunen, 2006, p. 309.)  
Consensus policy was in many ways favourable to business interests. In 
addition to prioritising competitiveness, consensus helped business circles in their 
efforts to thwart the threat of leftist radicalism. Consensus curbed social conflict, 
depoliticised decision-making, and concentrated political power in the hands of interest 
groups – including those presenting business interests. Last but not least, as EVA put it, 
consensus supported the market economy system in the sense that the economy was 
regulated through negotiations and cooperation, instead of forced control by the state. 
(EVA, 1977d; Jakobson, n.d.a; Saari, 2010; Smolander, 2001.)  
 
 
Kauppinen (1992, p. 285) has characterised the adoption of a consensus 
policy as an extension of the compromise that had been reached over labour market 
issues in 1968; consensus broadened the labour market compromise into an agreement 
on the fundamentals of economic policy. The extent of either compromise should not be 
overemphasised. Incomes policy did not spell an end to disputes between the labour 
market parties either on the shop floor or between the SAK and the STK (see, Bergholm 
2018, pp. 49, 95). Neither did consensus always translate into actual economic policies 
that would have completely satisfied the Finnish business leaders.  
Nevertheless, Finnish corporatism and consensus formed a mutually 
reinforcing whole. The adoption of a consensus policy strengthened tripartite labour 
market negotiations in Finland when the foundations of corporatist decision-making 
were crumbling in the Anglo-American world (Schmitter, 2010). Incomes policy and 
consensus shared the same underlying rationale: the prioritisation of competitiveness as 
the first and foremost goal of economic policy. Both also had the same downside, i.e. 
having to accept social reform in return for the acknowledgement of competitiveness as 
an imperative.  
Furthermore, both corporatism and consensus helped to depoliticise 
decision-making at a time when business leaders considered the political climate 
unfavourable, even hostile, to their interests. The de-politicisation of decision-making 
on social and labour market reforms had been a consistent strategy of the STK at the 
latest from the 1950s onward. Since the employers considered decisions made by the 
government or the parliament unpredictable, the STK preferred negotiated settlements 
with the SAK. (STK executive committee, 1957; STKV, 1958; STK board, 1960). The 
dominance of centre-left governments gave a strong incentive for the employers to 
secure their influence through participation in tripartite corporatist decision-making. 
 
 
Similarly, consensus served as an open invitation for Finnish business to sit at the 
negotiation table for economic policies.     
The advantages of consensus did not end there. Besides helping to curb 
government control, consensus could be used as a means to control the state itself. The 
attempts of the business community to modify the size and tasks of the Finnish welfare 
state are the topic of the next section. 
Retasking the welfare state 
In addition to the state intervention in the economy, Finnish business circles worried 
about the growth of the public sector. In the early 1970s, the Finnish fiscal policy was 
loose, and the expansion of the public sector only accelerated from the mid-1970s 
onwards (Heikkinen & Tiihonen, 2010, p. 160). Business leaders in the STK and the 
Central Committee of Finnish Industry criticised the high level of Finnish social 
expenditure and the large share of employers in their funding. They complained about 
the ‘demoralising consequences’ of social transfers and the detrimental effects of social 
security on willingness to work. (STKV, 1972; STK board, 1973, 1974). 
Soon after its establishment, EVA joined in the criticism. Despite Finnish 
consensus being characterised as a compromise between competitiveness and social 
reform, already EVA’s early initiatives on an economic policy consensus aimed at 
limiting welfare expenditure. For instance, Chairman of EVA Mika Tiivola, CEO of 
Union Bank of Finland, stated in December 1976 that consensus should include an 
agreement on the reallocation of resources, from public spending to productive 
activities (EVA, 1976c). The following year after the so-called compromise of 
consensus, the STK prepared a memorandum which called for freezes or cuts in welfare 
benefits and rolled responsibility for their funding from the employers to beneficiaries 
themselves (STK board, 1978). 
 
 
EVA’s leaders saw that the wide consensus reached in the late 1970s included a 
general acceptance of an extensive welfare system. Nevertheless, EVA stressed that a 
consensus also needed to be reached on the necessity of limiting the growth of the 
public sector and welfare costs. As a rule of thumb, the size of the public sector should 
not exceed 40 per cent in relation to the GDP, or difficulties would arise. In addition, 
the growth rate of the public sector was to be adapted to that of the national economy, at 
the most. (Tiivola, 1981; Jakobson, n.d.b.) 
EVA declared that it just wanted to reform, not dismantle the Finnish welfare 
state. It was necessary to put an end to the growth of the public sector while 
simultaneously securing the maintenance of the welfare system. Nevertheless, there was 
no alternative to the reform; the Finnish welfare system was not threatened by cuts but 
by failing to make them. (Sipponen, 1985, 1987a; Tiivola, 1985.) The STK 
accompanied by stressing the need to adapt to the conditions of unsteady economic 
growth through the retrenchment of welfare spending and benefit levels. Failing to do 
so would unavoidably lead to a funding crisis, forced measures, and painful cost cuts. 
(STK executive committee, 1984.) 
 EVA called for a welfare state reform that followed the ‘requirements of the 
era’: welfare services had to become more flexible and efficient, and private enterprises, 
nongovernmental organisations, and families had to be given a bigger role in their 
production. Social policy was to be redirected by allocating benefits only to the most 
disadvantaged, and unnecessary bureaucracy needed to be eliminated and market logic 
applied to the whole welfare system. (Jakobson, 1981; Pirttimäki, 1985; Sipponen, 
1987a, 1987b.) When defining its own demands, the STK cited examples from other 
West European countries that had already carried out cost-curbing reforms. 
 
 
Competitors’ welfare cuts left Finland no choice but to follow down the same path. 
(STK executive committee, 1984.) 
Already in the 1970s, the STK had complained that too high a level of welfare 
entitlements was detrimental to work motivation (STK board, 1978). The next decade, 
the employers’ attitudes toward ‘oversized’ social security only hardened. The STK 
suspected that the unemployment benefit system ran the risk of tempting people to 
choose voluntary unemployment. A potential solution to this problem was suggested by 
Pekka Herlin, president of the elevator and escalator maker Kone, according to whom 
unemployment benefit should be paid only for a fixed period, after which the level of 
the entitlement would quickly decline unless the beneficiary actively sought for 
employment (STK board, 1986). 
In its ‘guidelines for social policies in the 1980s’, the STK emphasised the 
importance of measures that would encourage employment and employability, restrict 
the growth of the public sector and the employers’ share in its funding, and reallocate 
resources from social transfers to the promotion of economic activity and creation of 
jobs. In the future, the STK wanted to see an increasing share of public spending being 
allocated from the provision of welfare services to the promotion of business activity, 
education, and culture. (STK executive committee, 1984.) Similarly, EVA wanted to 
transform the welfare state to a ‘coaching state’, whose purpose would be to educate its 
citizens to cope with increasing international competition. Regarding welfare services, 
the responsibility of the state would be the provision of only minimum security. The 
public sector was to be recast as a provider of education and opportunities instead of 
comprehensive, universal welfare benefits. (Kivelä, 1987; Sipponen, 1987b.) 
The tripartite negotiations, in which not only labour market issues but also social 
policies were settled, in principle gave the STK a useful avenue through which to retask 
 
 
the Finnish welfare state as outlined by the business organisations. However, in 
practice, the STK treaded carefully so as not to provoke trade unions and the public 
opinion (STK board, 1985, 1987). The 1980s were not the most opportune time to 
advance retrenchment policies. Welfare spending continued to grow throughout the 
decade, as an economic upturn helped Finland to finalise the building of a Nordic 
welfare system. (Kuisma and Keskisarja, 2012, p. 258.) In the booming economy, 
businesses preferred to pay their share of social security contributions than risk losing 
revenue due to industrial action. This risk was of real concern as the annual number of 
strikes in Finland remained high until the 1990s (Bergholm, 2018, p. 508).  
It is, nonetheless, important to note the business community’s unanimity about 
the necessity for reform of the role and extent of the welfare state. Business’s discontent 
with extensive welfare services and spending is unsurprising in itself: business 
communities have, after all, grumbled over the unbearable burden caused by social 
legislation for as long as the labour movement has pushed for social reform – hardly a 
specifically neoliberal cause for complaint, then. Accordingly, these features alone 
cannot be labelled neoliberal and separated from the liberal ideas traditionally 
advocated by business leaders.  
It was precisely the goal of retasking the welfare state that made EVA and the 
STK’s initiatives neoliberal in distinction from classical liberalism: the focus of 
neoliberal reform is not in dismantling the state, but in repurposing the state into a 
defender of free markets and a promoter of competitiveness and provider of minimum 
social security. Accordingly, EVA did not pursue a passive ‘night-watchman state’, but 
a strong and active ‘coaching state’. This paper thus lends further support for the 
findings of previous scholarship that place the redefinition of the state and its tasks in 
the centre of neoliberal reform.  
 
 
The next section assesses the reception of EVA and the STK’s social policy 
initiatives and their influence on Finnish politics. 
A neoliberal consensus? 
Finnish public opinion was not favourably disposed to the business circles’ demands for 
a welfare state reform. On the contrary, the Finnish public was – and still is – 
persistently in favour of an extensive welfare state (Blomberg & Kroll, 2017). Among 
leading politicians and officials, however, a decisive shift took place in the 1980s. They 
increasingly turned against the expansion of welfare services and adopted the public 
sector reform as a guiding idea. (Julkunen, 2001, pp. 60–62, 235–236; Outinen, 2017.)  
Judging solely by numbers, the translation of some of EVA and the STK’s 
demands into practical policies has nevertheless failed to hit the mark. While the goal of 
curtailing public sector growth was, in principle, adopted by the leading political parties 
already in the 1980s, its size only continued to grow from around 45 per cent in the 
latter part of the 1980s to over 60 per cent in the early 1990s. A deep economic 
depression in the early 1990s explains this phenomenal growth: economic activity froze 
and tax revenue dropped dramatically at the same time as unemployment costs soared, 
thus, increasing the size of state expenditure in relation to the GDP. (Heikkinen & 
Tiihonen, 2010, 322–323.)  
The early-1990s depression was caused by an ‘endemic’ economic overheating 
combined with a downturn in the Western export markets and the collapse of Finland’s 
trade with the dissolving Soviet Union. Finnish industrial production plummeted, the 
stock market crashed, and apartment prices tumbled. Redundancies, lay-offs, and 
bankruptcies became commonplace. In the first part of the 1990s, Finnish public debt 
skyrocketed from 12 to 60 per cent of GDP. (Honkapohja & Koskela, 2014.) 
 
 
While the circumstances were far from favourable for the employers from the 
business perspective, it seemed to offer them an opportunity to push through a radical, 
pro-employer reform in the Finnish industrial relations (Bergholm, 2018, pp. 497–498). 
At the same time, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave business the upper hand, 
politically speaking: the threat of communism, which had been among the employers’ 
main motivations to engage in centralised incomes policy, disappeared once and for all.  
The STK drew up a list of demands in 1991 that included a wage freeze for two 
years and a 5 per cent general wage cut, a reduction or abolition of several employers’ 
social insurance payments, and an increase in annual work hours without salary 
compensation (STK executive committee, 1991). Not all of the STK’s demands were 
realised but a centralised wage agreement froze wage increases for two years and passed 
a portion of the employers’ social security contributions to the responsibility of 
employees (Kiander et al., 2011, p. 524). However, during the years of recession, the 
STK did not force through a thorough reshaping of the industrial relations system. A 
plausible explanation has been provided by Bergholm (2018, pp. 513, 516), who 
suggests that employers gave up a radical transformation of industrial relations because 
the business circles needed the support of trade unions to realise the overarching goal of 
Finland’s EU membership, which was achieved in 1995. 
The early-1990s economic depression nonetheless was a major watershed in 
Finnish welfare state, consensus, and labour market policies. According to Kantola and 
Kananen (2017) and Sorsa (2017), the Finnish decision-makers discarded the welfare 
state principle in favour of a competition state idea, which prioritises competitiveness 
over welfare. The fundamental task of a competition state is to spur production and 
encourage employment. The purpose of welfare services is to educate skilled workforce, 
create incentives to work, maintain social peace, and provide only for the least well-off. 
 
 
All of this is, of course, very much in line with the visions sketched out by the business 
community already in the 1980s.  
The shift from the welfare state to a competition state has not put an end to the 
growth of the public sector. While the relative growth of the public sector continued, a 
decisive qualitative shift has, nevertheless, taken place within the continuously large 
Finnish public sector. Yliaska (2015) has illuminated a reallocation of resources from 
welfare services to research and development and venture capital within the public 
sector. This reallocation is a prime example of a ‘new kind of state interventionism’ that 
is compatible with the neoliberal objective of retasking rather than rolling back the 
state. 
Finnish consensus policy also transformed. Already in the course of the 1980s, 
the compromise between social reform and competitiveness had begun to fade. The 
depression of the early 1990s, at the latest, dropped social reform from the content of 
consensus, and eventually only the competitiveness imperative remained. Finnish 
consensus lived on in the form of decision-makers’ unanimity on the priority of 
‘economic facts’ over political desires. Consensus renders discussions over policy 
choices unnecessary. (See, Kantola, 2002, pp. 276, 285–286.) In this sense, economic-
policy consensus over the competitiveness imperative is a prime example of the 
neoliberal principle of ‘there is no alternative’. 
The transformation of Finnish labour market policies has been more subtle but 
the trajectory is nevertheless clear. After the 1990s recession, tripartite incomes policy 
was taken up as a means of fostering economic recovery and solving mass 
unemployment (Kiander et al., 2011, p. 524). Centralised wage agreements have been 
concluded up until the 2010s. However, the STK’s successor Elinkeinoelämän 
Keskusliitto (EK, the Confederation of Finnish Industries) decided in 2007 to withdraw 
 
 
from centralised bargaining. In 2017, the EK announced unilaterally that from then on, 
all future agreements would be concluded at sectoral or local level.   
 Despite the decentralising trend in wage bargaining, major economic, social, 
and labour market policy issues are still taken to the tripartite negotiation table. 
However, the negotiations no longer concern the expansion of welfare services (as they 
did prior to the 1990s) but welfare retrenchment, active labour market policies, and the 
promotion of competitiveness. (See, Kananen, 2017, pp. 31–35; Kiander et al., 2011, p. 
528.) The development in Finland once again resonates well with scholarship on 
neoliberalism. According to political scientists, neoliberalism does not necessarily spell 
the end of corporatism but only its modification: for instance, tripartite wage 
agreements have been predicted to disappear and give way to individual bargaining, 
while the upper-level political process can still remain in essence corporatist. 
(Savtschenko, 2015, p. 34.) 
All in all, Finnish welfare, consensus, and labour market policies have since the 
1990s been developed along the lines advocated by business already in the previous 
decades. Thus, the adopted policies have emphasised the promotion of competitiveness, 
active labour market measures, retrenchment of social security, and reallocation of 
public resources from redistribution of welfare to fostering economic growth. However, 
most scholarship has accredited the change to the early-1990s economic depression, 
without paying enough attention to earlier developments. (Kananen, 2017; Kantola, 
2002; Kantola & Kananen, 2017; Sorsa, 2017.) The argument promoted by this paper is 
that a decisive shift took place in the 1970s and 1980s, when the business community 
set to work on retasking the corporatist Finnish welfare state to better correspond with 
business interests and neoliberal ideas. 
 
 
The role of EVA was to formulate policy ideas and leave them – in a 
Friedmanesque fashion – ‘laying around’ until they were accepted as politically 
inevitable (Friedman, 1962/1982, viii–ix). In the Finnish case, this happened during and 
after the 1990s economic depression. For its part, the STK translated EVA’s abstract 
ideas into the language of realisable labour market policies. The strategy of both EVA 
and the STK was to harness local policy-making traditions and institutions to the 
advantage of business interests. The strategy called for patience but has yielded, in the 
long term, favourable outcomes without risking social peace or provoking loud protests. 
Smolander (2001) has earlier noted the apparent paradox that in Finland 
neoliberal policies have been advanced in the framework of political consensus and 
corporatist decision-making. However, this paradox disappears when we look at 
consensus and corporatism as instruments for the Finnish business community for 
pushing through neoliberal policies (see, Sipponen, 1986; Tiivola, 1984). The strategy 
seems to exemplify embedded neoliberalism as proposed by Ban (2016): embedded 
neoliberalism seeks to ensure market credibility and competitiveness while at the same 
time using the (welfare) state as a buffer against social problems inflicted by increased 
market competition.  
EVA utilised consensus to prioritise free markets and international 
competitiveness against state-led economic regulation and expansion of welfare 
services. Similarly, the STK gradually foisted a reform of social and labour market 
policies into the agenda of tripartite negotiations. Instead of outright demolition, the 
outcome has been the redefinition, retasking, and incremental neoliberal transformation 
of the corporatist Finnish welfare state from a provider of welfare to a promoter of 




This paper has presented an empirical examination of the advent of neoliberalism in 
Finland, a Nordic welfare state with strong corporatist traditions. The paper has argued 
that the Finnish business community adopted neoliberal ideas and policies, such as 
economic deregulation, welfare retrenchment, and active labour market policies. It is 
hardly surprising in itself that the Finnish business community – studied here through 
the lens of a free market think-tank EVA and the employers’ association STK – pursued 
policies that corresponded with neoliberal ideas. The novelty of the Finnish case lies in 
that EVA and the STK were able to advance these goals with seemingly non-neoliberal 
means, i.e. an economic policy consensus and tripartite corporatist arrangements. Thus, 
EVA used consensus to prioritise international competitiveness over economic 
regulation and social redistribution, while the STK was able to advance active social 
and labour market policies at the tripartite negotiation table. 
The downside of this strategy is that incremental change is slow and thus 
requires patience. Accordingly, the fruits of EVA and the STK’s 1970s and 1980s 
initiatives only ripened during and after the 1990s, when a deep economic depression 
induced a change of course in the Finnish welfare policies from expansion to 
retrenchment. As judged by social scientists, the main goal of Finnish welfare policies 
has shifted from the 1990s onwards from the generation and provision of welfare to the 
encouragement of competitiveness, productivity, and employment – a direction 
envisioned by the business community already in the previous decades. Compared with 
a more aggressive approach, the advantage is that incremental transition is more subtle 
and thus provokes less social debate or protest, thereby helping to maintain social peace 
and stability. 
From a methodological point of view, incremental change makes it particularly 
difficult to pin down the exact influence of EVA and the STK on the transformation that 
 
 
has taken place. Dür (2008, 2018) has proposed methods for measuring interest group 
influence on individual policy processes, and their application and assessment presents 
an important task for future research. Challenging as it is to prove the influence of 
business interest associations on single legislative projects, it is even more difficult to 
discern such an influence on a more gradual process such as the incremental transition 
examined in this paper.  
Referring to earlier think tank research, it is important to note that the ideas 
brought forth by EVA (and the STK) were embraced, rather than rejected, which can be 
interpreted as an attestation of their success (McGann, 2007, p. 44; Rich, 2004, p. 153). 
Moreover, the significance of the groundwork done by business pre-1990s should not be 
underestimated. After all, policy ideas and initiatives do come from somewhere, and 
they have to be put forth by someone before they can be taken up and realised by 
decision-makers. In the Finnish case presented in this paper, it was the think tank EVA 
that envisaged ways in which the Finnish welfare state could be developed in a more 
market-friendly and less statist direction. The STK moulded high-level concepts into 
practical labour market and social policy measures through participation in tripartite 
cooperation.  
Both EVA and the STK pursued goals that can be characterised as neoliberal: 
economic deregulation, tax cuts, prioritisation of competitiveness, reallocation of public 
spending, introduction of privatised and/or means-tested social services, and active 
social and labour market policies. What makes these pursuits neoliberal is the central 
role that business gave to the state in their realisation. Instead of dismantling the state, 
neoliberalism retasks the state – or, in the Finnish case, the corporatist welfare state. 
Both EVA and the STK were able to utilise and redefine consensus and corporatism to 
suit their own ends and, accordingly, had no reason to do away with them. The end 
 
 
result was the outline of an economic-policy consensus and of the reform and 
redefinition, not demolition of the corporatist Finnish welfare state. (See, Menz, 2017, 
pp. 133–135.)  
Scholars have sometimes wondered how and why corporatist structures have 
been so resilient, despite radical changes in the political climate over the past few 
decades (e.g. Traxler, 2010). This paper points to the perhaps surprising compatibility 
of consensus and corporatism with neoliberal policies. The Finnish case presented here 
serves to show that business circles have benefited from corporatist arrangements and 
consensus policies, even though their participation was initially dictated by necessity in 
the leftist-oriented political climate of the 1970s. Over the course of the 1980s and 
increasingly so from the 1990s onwards, however, business has been able to reformulate 
the content of both corporatist agreements and consensus in a neoliberal manner. 
The main contribution of this paper is to the debate over whether business may 
genuinely support corporatist institutions and social democratic welfare systems, or if 
business instead rallies behind a neoliberal assault on them. Based on the findings of 
this paper, the answer would be both: the Finnish business community advanced 
neoliberal policies precisely by utilising – and, thus, implicitly, supporting – the Finnish 
welfare state and its consensual, corporatist policy-making traditions. The support did 
not necessarily stem from commitment to consensus and corporatism as values per se 
but, rather, from their usefulness as avenues for advancing the interests of business. 
This answer may be unsatisfactory to theorists on either side of the debate but it is, 
nonetheless, the most faithful to historical empirics. 
This article has supported the claims of previous scholarship that there is 
considerable variation in the ways in which different countries have implemented 
neoliberal policies. There are also various paths toward neoliberal reform. However, 
 
 
there is no reason to assume that the Finnish example presented here would be unique: 
the curious combination of corporatism, consensus, and neoliberalism may well have 
occurred elsewhere, too. It would thus be worthwhile in future research to examine 
whether the Finnish case resonates with other national settings. 
Similar questions about the role of business in advancing or opposing policy 
ideas and practices can and should be applied to other eras and ideologies as well. 
Business historians should increasingly widen the scope of their attention from the 
economic realm to those of politics and ideologies, including the interaction between 
these distinct but overlapping spheres (see, Yeşilbağ, 2016). Even if the sphere of ideas 
may feel too opaque and vague to study, it cannot be ignored if we want to be able to 
say something about the social and political role of business in the world today. When it 
comes to neoliberalism, doing so would allow business historians to earn their place 
along the more social-scientific researchers by providing precisely the historical 
perspective and empirical evidence that the latter have called for. Furthermore, this line 
of inquiry would provide one possible answer to the challenge posed by the leading 
business historians for their colleagues to take up ‘big questions’ that have widespread, 
even global, significance and are of interest to both politicians and the general public 
alike. 
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